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of-use#LAADimensions  of Liberal Self-Satisfaction: 
Civil Liberties, Liberal Theory, 
and Elite-Mass Differences* 
Jennrfer  L. Hochschildt 
Dimensions  of  Tolerance,  by  Herbert  McClosky and  Alida  Brill, epitomizes  both 
the  best  and  the  worst  of  behavioralism,  American  liberal  ideology,  and  the 
connection  between  them.  It is, in that  sense,  a culmination  of  thirty years of 
American  political  science.  A  response  to  it  inevitably  appears  old-fashioned 
because the book itself is old-fashioned.  It forces us to confront  once more issues 
of  methodological  individualism,  the  role  of  individual  psychology  in  political 
judgment,  the  subtle  intertwinings  of  fact  and  value,  the  place  of  the  Bill  of 
Rights  in American  politics,  the  virtues  of elite  libertarianism  and  the  dangers 
of mass authoritarianism,  and other such issues that exercised  political scientists 
in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  My-and  the  authors'-hope  is that  these  issues  are 
worth yet another  round  of reflection  and that we have learned  something  since 
the last time we considered  them. 
We need  first to see the book as the authors do.  McClosky and Brill set out 
in  1976  to answer  "two related  questions:  What influences  impel  some  people 
to honor and protect the liberties of others, even when those liberties are employed 
for purposes  they perceive  as hateful? What leads some  men  and women,  even 
in  a democracy,  to  assail the  rights  of  those  with  whom  they  disagree  and  to 
honor  obedience,  orthodoxy,  and  conformity  over  freedom?"  (p.  415).  Their 
answers come in the form of responses to an extensive close-ended  opinion  survey 
of  a national  sample  of  the  "mass public" and  a large  sample  of  "community 
leaders  and  activists engaged  in  various  vocations  and  playing  various  roles." 
Both  groups  chose  one  of  two endings  to a sentence,  such  as "For children  to 
be  properly  educated:  1) They  should  be free  to discuss all ideas and subjects, 
no matter what. 2) They should be protected against ideas the community considers 
wrong or dangerous.  3) Neither.  4) Undecided." (The survey contained  over 320 
such questions,  as well as demographic  queries and a few other opinion  questions 
in different formats. Several other surveys also play subsidiary roles in the analysis.) 
The  authors  report  their findings  in exhaustive  detail. Their  main  point  is 
that community  leaders and activists are more libertarian than the mass public, 
with about  one-third  of  the  mass public and  two-thirds  of  the  leaders  strongly 
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supportive  of civil liberties.  Variations  in this general  finding  are considerable. 
People support  civil liberties more in the abstract than in concrete cases in which 
they  fear  or  hate  the  group  they  are  asked  to  respect.  Some  leaders,  such  as 
lawyers and judges,  are on average  more libertarian than other  leaders,  such as 
police officers. Some rights, such as the right to hold a protest march, are endorsed 
more  than  others,  such  as the  right to spit on  the  flag. Some  question  formats 
or sentence  wordings generate  more civil libertarian responses  than others. Then 
there  are complex  interactions:  some  elites  (their word) support  some  forms  of 
civil liberty more than other forms, or more than other elites do. And so on. But 
the bottom  line, which  is demonstrated  over and over, is that political elites are 
more  tolerant  than masses and that the mass public is dangerously  intolerant  in 
at least some  areas. 
McClosky and  Brill then  ask why and  produce  several  answers.  The  most 
important  in  their  eyes  is "social learning," by which  people  who  are  close  to 
power  centers  and/or  politically  active learn  and  adopt  the  basic norms  of  our 
liberal society. They  do not explain exactly how this process occurs-it  is "highly 
complicated  for any given  individual" (p. 28)-nor  do they seek to demonstrate 
its occurrence.  Their  main  evidence  for the existence  of  social learning  is data 
showing  that  political  activists are  more  libertarian  than  nonactivists  with  the 
same  demographic  characteristics  (age,  religiosity,  education,  income,  region, 
and  cosmopolitanism  of residence).  These  data do  not  eliminate  the  possibility 
of self-selection-those  already inclined  to adopt civil libertarian norms become 
the most politically active-or  of systemic bias-those  who conform  to the norms 
held by current elites are most successful in gaining political influence. Nevertheless, 
McClosky and Brill see the data as demonstrating  that "activity in public affairs 
...  produce[s] greater familiarity with the prevailing values of the political culture. 
Since  ...  in  the  United  States  these  values  are  predominantly  libertarian,  the 
elites ...  embrace them  more strongly than do the members  of the mass public" 
(p. 27). 
Their  other explanations  for variation in tolerance are subsidiary but equally 
revealing of their underlying assumptions. One is demographic-the  well educated 
(especially those with high "intellectuality"), the well off, the young,  city dwellers, 
and (to a modest  degree)  Northerners,  and men support civil liberties more than 
their  opposites.  Another  explanation  is psychological-people  who  are misan- 
thropic, inflexible,  anomic, conformist,  and low in self-esteem  support fewer civil 
liberties than their opposites.  A final explanation  is substantive-liberals  are more 
libertarian than conservatives;  the secular are more libertarian than the devout; 
people  support groups whose values they endorse more than groups whose values 
they  oppose;  and  most  generally,  for  some  people  other  values  outweigh  civil 
liberties. 
McClosky and  Brill conclude  with  a mix  of  worry  and  hope.  On  the  one 
hand,  the  young  are more  libertarian than  the  old  and  "intuitive observation" 
suggests  that  much  of  this  tolerance  will remain  with  the  young  as they  age. 
More  important,  the  influential  and  powerful  are generally  tolerant,  so  liber- 
tarianism has strength beyond its numbers. On the other hand, however, many- 
perhaps most-of  the public is not tolerant of many-perhaps  most-expressions 
of civil liberties, and it is very difficult for most citizens to learn why they should 
endorse freedom  for groups they hate or fear. Thus McClosky and Brill "conclude 
with  an  observation  with  which  we  began-that  civil  liberties  are  fragile  and 
susceptible  to the  political  climate  of  the  time,  . . . a result  in great  part of  the 388  Ethics  January 1986 
failure  of  large  segments  of  the  population  to have effectively  internalized  the 
libertarian norms  to which  the American  political culture,  from  the beginning, 
has been  dedicated" (pp. 437-38). 
NO  SURPRISES 
The  sentence  just  quoted  hints  inadvertently  at many  of  the  problems  of  the 
book, as well as its virtues. Let me begin  with the authors' apparently  trivial but 
actually revealing  comment  about "conclud[ing] with an observation  with which 
we began." The  book  has no  surprises,  in several  senses.  First, it recapitulates, 
with  much  more  detail  and  sophistication,  McClosky's famous  articles of  1964 
and  1965.'  He  and  his  coauthor  made  precisely  the  same  argument  then- 
American  elites  are  more  libertarian  than  masses,  and  intolerance  is  partly  a 
consequence  of personality  defects-and  the world has apparently  not changed 
a bit in twenty years. This stability suggests  either that McClosky (and coauthors) 
has been  untouched  by the  political  passions  and  insights  swirling  around  the 
civil rights movement, Vietnam, Watergate, and other challenges to liberal certitude 
or that this book taps a deep  underlying  structure of American  political ideology 
that persists regardless of ephemeral  events and political fads. Political scientists, 
of  course,  hope  that their  work achieves  the  latter goal,  but  in this case  I fear 
the former outcome; the book too often averts its eyes from troubling or provocative 
aspects  of  liberal theory  that would  force  a reconsideration  of  accepted  liberal 
truths. 
This  point  is illustrated  by the second  way in which Dimensions  of Tolerance 
has no surprises. It systematically denies or smooths over tensions and contradictions 
within  liberal  theory,  so  it gives  us  few  new  ideas  or insights  on  how  to  think 
about civil liberties.  McClosky and Brill, for example,  recognize  that sometimes 
equality and liberty conflict, but they argue that most of the time the two norms 
reinforce  each other.  In their words, 
The  domains  of freedom  and equality ...  are not always or in all respects 
compatible....  Nevertheless,  ...  more  often  than  not,  the  advancement 
of one  serves to promote  the other.  If blacks or Jews or women  or Indians 
are permitted  to enjoy the full benefits  of their civil rights,  many of them 
will  move  into  higher  stations  in  society  in  which  they  will  be  able  to 
disseminate  their  views  and  to  protect  their  rights  of  privacy  and  due 
process....  [Conversely],  as individuals  gain greater command  over their 
civil liberties,  they also gain greater access to society's benefits.  Possessing 
freedom,  they  are in a far stronger  position  to carry on  the  struggle  for 
their civil rights.  [P. 327] 
This  passage  is empirically  arguable; blacks and women  now enjoy  much  more 
liberty than they did thirty years ago but not a corresponding  degree  of economic 
equality  with whites  or men.2 More important,  however,  the  passage  wears in- 
1. Herbert  McClosky,  "Consensus  and Ideology  in American  Politics,"  American  Political 
Science  Review  58 (1964): 361-82;  Herbert McClosky  and John H. Schaar,  "Psychological 
Dimensions  of Anomy," American Sociological  Review 30 (1965):  14-40. 
2. A small indication of the relative lack of economic equalization  lies in data on 
median  family  income. By that measure,  blacks  held 59 percent  of whites'  holdings  in 1967 
(the first  year with accurate  data)  but only 55 percent  in 1982. (U.S. Bureau  of the Census, 
Money  Income  of Households,  Families,  and Persons  in the United  States,  1981, Current Population 
Reports, ser. P-60, no. 137 [Washington,  D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983], pp. Hochschild  Review  Essay  389 
tellectual  blinders.  McClosky and  Brill ignore  any specification  of equality  that 
might  impinge  on  strong  definitions  of  civil  liberties  (such  as  some  form  of 
"equality of results" that would  entail  affirmative  action or redistribution  of re- 
sources) and focus only on equality as an equal right to pursue one's own ends- 
that is, equality  as liberty. Once  equality  is made  synonymous  with liberty, it is 
not surprising that "the findings strongly confirm ...  our belief...  that sensitivity 
to human  rights in one domain  (for example,  civil liberties) would, in most cases, 
go  hand  in  hand  with  sensitivity  to human  rights  in  the  other  [civil rights,  or 
equality]" (p. 328).  Thus  their implicit definition  of equality is so narrow that it 
has no bite politically and does  no work theoretically. 
My comment  here goes beyond  criticism of the book to a larger point about 
liberal  theory  (or  at  least  liberal  theorists).  It  is  the  great  glory  or  fatal  flaw, 
depending  on  one's  perspective,  of  the  liberal tradition  that it simultaneously 
affirms contradictory values-liberty  versus equality, family autonomy and private 
wealth versus individual  equal opportunity,  majority rule versus minority rights, 
et cetera.3 To deny these contradictions and their inevitably accompanying tensions 
is to be politically complacent  and intellectually  superficial. 
The  final  meaning  of  "no surprises" ties  into  the  second.  The  book  does 
nothing  to disconcert its most likely audience-politically  active, intellectual, city- 
dwelling,  liberal elites. Over and over these turn out to be just the kind of people 
a liberal democracy  needs  to preserve its most valuable heritage.  Actually buried 
in the work, however, are some startling findings that should shake this complacency, 
but one  finds  them  only  with difficulty  (and after 400  pages).  For example,  on 
some  issues the mass public is just as libertarian as community  leaders, and both 
are more tolerant than the Supreme  Court. That is, ordinary citizens (even those 
with  less  than  a  high  school  education)  endorse  libertarian  values  denied  or 
hedged  by the Court as much as elites do (even though  elites are more libertarian 
on  Court-approved  liberties).  It is equally  difficult,  and  equally  intriguing,  to 
discover  that for  issues  on  which  both  the  Court and  elites  are nonlibertarian, 
the  poorly  educated  public is more  tolerant than the well-educated  public. And 
although  Dimensions  of Tolerance points them out,  it makes little of the facts that 
some  liberals would  deny  civil liberties to their opponents,  or that economically 
conservative  masses  are more  libertarian than economically  conservative  public 
and private officials, or that both liberal and conservative  elites (but not masses) 
are more  tolerant  of  Nazis  than  of  student  activists. The  authors,  in short,  are 
good  scholars who imaginatively  analyze their data and carefully report findings 
that  contradict  their  thesis;  but  they  do  not  have  an  eye  for  anomalies.  As  a 
consequence,  the book has a profound  predictability which will serve mainly to 
reinforce  the  self-satisfaction  of liberals and elites. 
39-40;  U.S.  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Money  Income  and  Poverty  Status  of Families  and  Persons 
in  the  United  States,  1982,  Current  Population  Reports,  ser.  P-60,  no.  140  [Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1983],  p.  7.)  Among  year-round,  full-time  workers, 
women  earned  64  percent  of  men's  earnings  in  1955  and  62  percent  of  men's  earnings  in 
1982.  (U.S.  Department  of  Labor,  The Earnings  Gap between  Women and  Men  [Washington, 
D.C.:  Government  Printing  Office,  1979],  p.  6;  Robert  Pear,  "Earnings  Gap  Is  Narrowing 
Slightly  for  Women,"  New  York Times  [October  3,  1983],  sec.  B.) 
3.  See,  e.g.,  James  S.  Fishkin,  Justice,  Equal  Opportunity,  and  the Family  (New  Haven, 
Conn.:  Yale  University  Press,  1983);  Douglas  Rae  et  al.,  Equalities  (Cambridge,  Mass.: 
Harvard  University  Press,  1981);  Guido  Calabresi  and  Philip  Bobbitt,  Tragic  Choices  (New 
York:  W.  W.  Norton  & Co.,  1978). 390  Ethics  January  1986 
But  "no surprises" indicates  virtues as well as defects.  Indeed,  the  flaws of 
Dimensions  of Tolerance  would  not merit much  consideration  if they did not rest 
on such a strong methodological  and substantive base. More important,  perhaps, 
Dimensions  of Tolerance  would  not be able to epitomize  liberal political science  as 
it does if it did not share the strengths of this tradition along with its weaknesses. 
What are its strengths?  Above  all, its subject. As McClosky and  Brill point 
out  in their concluding  sentence  quoted  above,  they hone  in on  "the norms  to 
which  the American  political culture,  from  the beginning,  has been  dedicated." 
These  norms -the  assertion of rights even  (especially?) for those who are hated 
or feared-are  surely the  most exciting  and worthy element  of liberalism.  The 
authors are eloquent  and compelling  in their claim that in a liberal society rights 
are not  privileges  to be earned  or won,  but claims to freedom  that inhere  in all 
members. Even those who would deny rights to others, or who have done nothing 
praiseworthy in their entire lives, have the right to speak, worship, and assemble 
as they please. 
A  second  value  permeating  this book  is equally  constitutive  of  liberalism, 
although  perhaps less universally admired. That is individualism-the  belief that 
each person  may think and (within certain bounds)  act as he or she pleases. The 
individualism  that Dimensions of Tolerance  hymns  is the  kind most  admirable  in 
liberal theory,  since  it focuses  on  political speech  and  action,  due  process,  and 
privacy rather than  on  material accumulation  or competition  for power.  At its 
core,  then,  the book  has no  surprises  for the right reason:  it focuses  on  values 
that constitute  American  political ideology  at its best. 
The  methods  of  Dimensions of Tolerance also  have  great  strength.  Survey 
research seems especially suited to a nation that asserts the importance of individual 
beliefs.  That,  after  all,  is what  survey  research  is all about-finding  out  what 
individuals  believe.  If one  can ask the right people  the right questions,  one  can 
simultaneously  advance  social science  knowledge  and  reinforce  the  democratic 
conviction that what ordinary people think matters. As Willie Loman says, "Attention 
must be paid,"  and pollsters do pay attention to people who ordinarily are voiceless 
to political decision  makers and  theorists  alike. Here,  too,  the  lack of surprises 
indicates strength.  The  authors know how to do survey research well: their item 
format yields a lot of information  while avoiding  many serious flaws of question 
wording; they chose their mass public sample well and their elite sample admirably; 
and they use simple and straightforward statistical techniques  that suit their task 
as  they  define  it.  Thus  there  are  no  unpleasant  surprises  in  their  empirical 
analysis  a comment  that amazingly  few books of this magnitude  merit. 
WHY ARE SOME PEOPLE TOLERANT? 
But apart from the problems of "no surprises"  described above, even these admirable 
values and methods  are finally unsatisfactory. For our purposes,  what matters is 
that the ways in which they are unsatisfactory  provide  almost a textbook case of 
the problems  of behavioral  political science  and liberal theory. 
Critiques of behavioralism are hardly novel, but in this case the methodological 
weaknesses  give us an opening  into  the underlying  normative  problems  of this 
analysis. In brief, survey research as conducted  and interpreted  by McClosky and 
Brill is insistently  individualistic and rigorously close-ended,  and the book mixes 
facts and  values  in  problematic  ways. Each characteristic limits the  depth  and, 
therefore,  worth of this book. Hochschild  Review  Essay  391 
Consider  methodological  individualism  first.  By asking  people  a series  of 
questions  and focusing  only on the aggregation  of their answers, the book leaves 
no  room  for  structural  or  collective  analysis.  In  quintessential  liberal  fashion, 
each  answer  has exactly  the  same  status as every other  answer,  and  nothing  is 
considered  except  the  answers. This  observation  does  not  fault what was done, 
but  it does  suggest  important  things  left  undone.  The  authors  point  out,  for 
example,  that professionals  and the wealthy are more tolerant than workers and 
the  poor,  but  they  do  not  consider  what  having  a low  income  or  manual job 
might  do to shape  the context  within which one  looks at civil liberties. Granting 
rights of due  process is more costly to residents of high-crime  ghettos  and slums 
than of low-crime suburbs -a  fact which merits attention in a discussion of "social 
learning." I am arguing  here  not  that slum dwellers  are justified  in intolerance 
toward criminal suspects, but that structures and environments may better explain 
attitudes  than  Freudian  defense  mechanisms  do. They  may not; we should  not 
assume  that  environment  shapes  views  in  predictable  ways any  more  than  we 
should  assume  that it is irrelevant. The  point is that an insistently  individualistic 
survey instrument  is a poor  tool for considering  this whole  issue. 
Further,  McClosky and  Brill not  only  do  not  consider  how  elites  come  to 
occupy their position-which,  after all, is not their task-but  they implicitly deny 
the  relevance  of  this question  in such  phrases  as "[elites] experience  a greater 
measure  of social learning  than do individuals who,for  whatever  reason, have had 
little opportunity  to participate  actively in the  public  affairs of  the  community 
or nation" (p. 238;  my emphasis).  This  point is important  because  of the book's 
underlying  presumption  that elites  are better  people,  at least in the  sense  that 
they are more libertarian, than the masses. Even if we accept the claim that elites 
are more  tolerant  (an issue that I will address below), we still do not know what 
to make of that fact: are they elite because  they are more tolerant  (self-selection 
or  systemic  bias),  or  more  tolerant  because  elite  (social learning),  or elite  and 
tolerant because of some other factor (intelligence  and flexibility, or an inherited 
status that permits them  to look with equanimity  on the actions of less-powerful 
others)? These  issues  are crucial to any understanding  of  the  relation  between 
tolerance  and status, but an individualistic survey focusing  only on one  moment 
of  time  does  not  even  lead  us  to  ask such  historical  and  structural  questions, 
never  mind  help  us to answer them. 
A final problem of methodological  individualism  is that it limits the authors' 
vision  of  not  only  observers  of  civil liberties  but  also  of  actors.  That  is,  most 
questions  address private actors doing  or saying something.  Government  enters 
the  picture  frequently,  of  course,  but  seldom  as an  expressor  of  rights.  This 
framework  keeps  McClosky and  Brill from  considering,  to take only one  issue, 
whether  the  state has the  same  right to free  speech  or "speech plus" (symbolic 
action) as private actors, or whether  the state speaks so much that private actors 
are  drowned  out,  or  whether  the  state  shapes  the  environment  within  which 
speech  occurs in ways that inhibit individuals' desire or capability to speak freely. 
Mark Yudof argues  that the eighteenth-century  image  of the First Amendment 
as an  issue  of  minority  speakers  against  majority  silencers,  perhaps  using  the 
government as censor, is largely outdated. The government itself is now a dominant 
speaker  and  symbolic  actor; an emerging  issue  is how  to limit communication 
by the state so that it does not curtail individual expression.4 However, the exclusive 
4.  Mark G. Yudof, When Government  Speaks:  Politics, Law, and Government  Expression  in 
America (Berkeley  and Los Angeles:  University  of California  Press,  1983). 392  Ethics  January 1986 
use of survey research inhibits consideration of actors other than private individuals 
and keeps the authors from noticing that forces such as corporations or government 
are appropriately  subjects of civil libertarian concern. 
Consider  next  the  relation  between  social scientific analysis and  normative 
argument-our  old  friend,  the  fact-value  distinction.  McClosky and  Brill  are 
much  too  sophisticated  to fall into the  normal  trap for the  naive; they are very 
clear about  their  own  values,  and the  book  is at its most  persuasive  when  they 
explicate  the beauty and urgency  of guaranteeing  rights and liberty. So they do 
not pretend  to have  no stake in the outcome  of their investigation.  But they do 
succumb to a more insidious form of social scientism. Despite their best intentions, 
McClosky and  Brill cannot  help  but see tolerant  elites  as better,  not  only  more 
knowledgeable  or thoroughly  socialized, than intolerant masses. In their laudable 
eagerness  to  promote  civil  liberties,  they  sometimes  mix  up  endorsement  of 
tolerance  with  endorsement  of  tolerators.  This  point  comes  from  a  different 
angle to the problems just raised-their  lack of consideration  of why some people 
are elites and others  not,  and why elites might  find it easier to be tolerant  than 
masses.  By associating  tolerance  with  elite  status,  and  by not  considering  how 
elites achieve their status and why elites are tolerant, Dimensions  of Tolerance  leads 
us to believe  that elites are better people  than masses are, and possibly, that they 
are elites because  they are better people.  This  subtle elitism is hard to pinpoint 
because  the authors  deny  it explicitly and sometimes  are careful to avoid it. But 
it emerges  in  such  sentences  as "Learning  libertarian  norms...  requires  not 
only  motivation  but a measure  of  knowledge,  enlightenment,  and  openness  to 
alternative  modes  of thought  and conduct  that are not  often  found  among  the 
mass public" (p. 56), and 
The low level of political interest displayed by vast numbers of the American 
people-a  level  of  apathy  that is strikingly revealed  in their  low turnout 
even  for  presidential  elections -also  manifests  itself  in  the  low  level  of 
awareness  and sophistication  exhibited  by members  of the  general  public 
when they confront the many vexing issues associated with the enforcement 
of civil liberties. Because  they have assumed  more active and far-reaching 
roles,  the  opinion  leaders  are more  likely to exhibit  greater  sensitivity  to 
public life and the values  that govern  it....  Their  awareness  of diversity 
is reinforced  by their greater  ability to move  about socially, intellectually, 
and even  physically....  They  are also more inclined  to embrace coherent 
belief  systems and ideologies,  and to draw from these beliefs and attitudes 
appropriate  inferences  for public policy and civil liberties.  [Pp. 418-19] 
What is ironic about such statements  and the findings  on which they rest is 
that they  can be used  as evidence  for two very different  theories  of democracy. 
One,  to which  McClosky and Brill probably subscribe, is that we are well served 
to have appropriately  socialized elites govern  us, given the sad but unmistakable 
fact  that  the  masses  are  basically intolerant.  We may  deplore  it, but  we  must 
accept  that liberal democracy  probably would  not  survive if elites  did not  hold 
disproportionate  power. The  other theory, held by such people  as Sheldon  Wolin 
and  Benjamin  Barber, is that these  data indict elite-run  "democracy" and  show 
that we must transfer power downward  to the masses.5 If, as McClosky and Brill 
5.  Sheldon  Wolin,  "The People's  Two  Bodies," Democracy  1 (1981):  9-24;  Benjamin 
Barber,  Strong Democracy:  Participatory  Politics  for  a New Age (Berkeley  and  Los Angeles: 
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argue,  people  learn (and thereby almost always embrace) civil libertarian norms 
by exercising  power  in conjunction  with others  also exercising  power,  then  the 
more  dispersed  power  is, the  more  libertarian the  masses will become.  If elites 
are libertarian because  powerful,  nonelites  will become  libertarian by becoming 
powerful. 
These  conflicting  interpretations  of the same evidence  require us to consider 
how  elites  come  to  be  elites.  If,  as  McClosky and  Brill sometimes  imply,  they 
achieve their status (and tolerance) because they are smarter, more self-confident, 
and  more  enlightened  than  the  masses,  then  we  could  not  hope  to  transfer 
tolerance downward even if we did transfer power. In that case, we should thank 
our lucky stars that merit rises to the top. If, however, the alternative theory that 
McClosky  and  Brill  ignore  is the  case-that  elites  (and  masses)  achieve  their 
status  through  birthright,  race,  sex,  or  sheer  blind  luck-and  if  the  theory  of 
social learning  is correct, then we have no reason to believe that tolerance cannot 
be  transferred  downward,  and  every  reason  to  transfer  power  (and  therefore 
tolerance)  to the masses. 
WHAT  IS TOLERANCE? 
Up  to this point  in the  discussion,  I have been  assuming  with the  authors  that 
there  is one  clear set of  civil libertarian norms  which  we all understand,  if not 
accept.  The  issue has been  precisely  that-who  accepts these  norms,  and why? 
The  final methodological  problem, however, raises a challenge to that assumption. 
It leads us to ask not who is libertarian and why, but what is libertarianism and 
how do we know? We move,  in short, from questions  of democracy  to questions 
of liberalism. 
Let us begin with the methodological  angle and consider the problems stem- 
ming from the book's complete  dependence  on close-ended  interview questions. 
This point has several facets. First, the authors cannot find out directly why their 
subjects  responded  as  they  did  to  the  inevitably  ambiguous  stimuli  of  survey 
items.  Most of the questions  are admirably clear, but some  are not.  (What is the 
tolerant response  to "When countries like Chile, Russia, or Uganda  clearly violate 
the human  rights of their citizens, which of these policies should  the U.S. follow: 
1) Find  a way to express  American  disapproval  of  such  violations;  or  2) Keep 
quiet,  since  the  way foreign  governments  treat their  own  citizens  is not  really 
our business"? If the unit of analysis is nations, the second  answer is the tolerant 
choice;  if the unit of analysis is individuals,  the first answer is preferable.)  Even 
for relatively unambiguous questions, the authors can do nothing but infer through 
"intuitive observation  and reasoning" why people  answer as they do. Do people 
seek to restrict abortion because  they see women  as predominantly  child bearers 
rather than citizens; or because  they weigh the rights of the father more heavily 
than  most  abortion  proponents  do;  or because,  in their  understanding  of  civil 
liberties,  liberties  of  the  fetus  dominate  those  of  the  mother?  If  opposition  to 
abortion  can conceivably  come  from anti-civil-libertarian views, alternative  civil 
libertarian views, or super-civil-libertarian views, to equate opposition  to abortion 
with  intolerance  is  merely  to  assume  that  civil  liberties  are  exactly  what  the 
Supreme  Court or scholars say they are. For some issues, of course, this problem 
is less severe-citizens  probably (although we cannot say for sure) share a reasonably 
similar understanding  of  the  core  meaning  of  free  speech,  so we  can  perhaps 
safely interpret their acceptance  or rejection of it. But the most interesting  issues 
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know what  leads  citizens  to reject  abortion,  or accept  licensed  prostitution,  or 
define  homosexuality  as a life-style  rather than  an illness  (to paraphrase  some 
of the survey questions).  By not including  open-ended  questions  or even  close- 
ended  probes to explore why citizens make the choices they do, the authors must 
either  assume  that they  (and right-minded  Americans)  know  exactly  what  the 
civil libertarian response  to complicated  issues is or admit that they cannot  dig 
very deeply  into Americans' belief  system. 
The  other  problem  with  a fixed-choice  survey  format  with  no  follow-up 
questions  is that the  authors  can say little about  connections  among  responses 
that do  not  conform  to the  civil libertarian model.  This  is the  old  bugaboo  of 
belief  system studies-the  problem  of attitude  consistency  and coherence.  The 
problem  is not, strictly speaking,  the methodological  issue of open-  versus close- 
ended  questions  but,  rather,  the  substantive  issue  of  internal  versus  external 
logic.  That  is, a fixed-choice  format  tells us whether  or how much  people  hold 
the  same  set  of  beliefs  as the  authors  about  many  topics-whether,  in  other 
words,  their  internal  logic  conforms  to  the  external  logic  of  the  survey.  Such 
surveys permit  us to say with considerable  certainty that X percent  of Y type of 
Americans  are libertarian on  issues A to C. If, however,  people  do not give the 
"tolerant" responses,  or do  so on  some  issues but not  others,  we know nothing 
about their belief  system except  that it is not the tolerant one  envisioned  by the 
surveyors. It is easy to conclude  that therefore they are intolerant or inconsistently 
tolerant,  but such a conclusion  is not warranted. All we know is one  thing  that 
their  belief  system  is not-we  do  not  know  what  their  belief  system  is. Their 
internal  logic  may  be  more  subtly  libertarian  than  the  survey  choices  permit 
respondents  to be, or it may be communitarian  rather than individualistic so that 
questions  about individual  rights are irrelevant to them,  or it may be incoherent 
or narrow minded.  We simply do not know. 
This point of logic is bolstered by empirical research that uses other interview 
formats  to reveal internal  logics that would  appear  incoherent  or intolerant  on 
most  fixed-choice  questionnaires.'  There  are, after  all, anti-abortion  feminists, 
pro-abortion  Catholics,  social libertarians and economic  conservatives,  political 
egalitarians  and economic  differentiators  (they are called liberals). And  all such 
"inconsistent" thinkers may hold views that from their perspective are compelling, 
coherent,  and  appropriately  tolerant.  They  may  not,  but  survey  research  as 
conducted  by McClosky and Brill cannot  distinguish  the  idiosyncratic from  the 
unintelligible  or intolerant. 
We have reached  at this point one of the most significant substantive issues 
for liberal theory raised by Dimensions  of Tolerance.  In brief; how do you know a 
civil liberty when you see one? McClosky and Brill answer this question  implicitly 
with  a rule  that  makes  as  much  sense  as, but  not  necessarily  more  than,  any 
other.  They  begin  with  the  Bill of  Rights,  particularly with  First, Fifth,  Sixth, 
and Fourteenth  Amendments,  and end with current (as of 1977) Supreme  Court 
interpretations  of those  amendments.  They  recognize,  indeed  insist on,  the in- 
6.  My own work in What's Fair: American  Beliefs about Distributive  Justice (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard  University  Press,  1981)  is one  source  of  the  contentions  in this  section. 
See  also Robert  E. Lane, Political  Ideology  (New  York: Free  Press,  1962);  Carol Stack, All 
Our Kin (New  York: Harper  & Row,  1974);  Milton Rokeach,  The Nature of Human Values 
(New  York: Free  Press,  1973);  Richard  M. Scammon  and  Ben  J.  Wattenberg,  The  Real 
Majority  (New York: Coward-McCann,  1970); and works by Robert Coles and Studs Terkel. Hochschild  Review Essay  395 
teresting  phenomena  of implied  rights such as privacy and contested  rights such 
as homosexual  marriage,  and  they  touch  on  contradictions  among  rights  such 
as "free press versus fair trial."  But they do not really address the radical uncertainty 
that these  issues  provoke.  How  can rights simultaneously  inhere  in all persons 
and vary according  to court doctrine?  Are rights discovered,  invented,  created, 
or what? What if the Court reverses itself, as Brown v. Board of Education rejected 
Plessy v. Ferguson? What  happened  to  the  right  to  separate  but  equal  public 
accommodations;  how  can  a inherent  right  disappear?  What  if rights  conflict: 
why did the rights of the fetus  dominate  until  1973  and the rights of  pregnant 
women  take precedence  after that date? Dimensions  of Tolerance  seems  to imply 
that a right is what the Supreme  Court says it is at the moment,  but that answer 
is hardly compelling. 
McClosky and Brill are not writing as constitutional scholars, and constitutional 
scholars are not  noted  for their unanimity  on  the definition  and boundaries  of 
rights. So it would be unfair to expect  the authors to resolve the questions  raised 
above.  But  the  absence  of  any  discussion  of  how  rights  are  defined  leads  to 
troubling  gaps in the analysis, as well as to troubling  questions  about the nature 
of liberalism  itself. The  book does  not discuss, for example,  gun  control  or the 
rights of parents over their children; is that because the Court has not definitively 
ruled  on  these  issues?  Nor  does  it address  property  rights,  welfare  rights,  civil 
rights, and the whole set of "positive freedoms" invoked by these terms. McClosky 
and  Brill say that  these  issues  primarily involve  equality  rather  than  freedom 
and are to be addressed  in their next book.  Fair enough,  but we readers should 
at least be  aware of  the  huge  set of  ideological  baggage  that underlies  a sharp 
distinction  between  rights defined  as liberties and rights defined  as equalities. 
Most important,  the question  of what liberty is feeds  directly into questions 
about the main thesis, that elites are more tolerant than masses. The  connection 
is clearest  in the  most  interesting  chapter,  which  tackles the complicated  issues 
of newly evolving  rights. One interpretation  of the data in chapter 5 is that elites 
are not more libertarian than masses but simply more attuned  to the vagaries of 
Supreme  Court doctrine.  Once the Court has ruled on an issue, such as women's 
employment  rights, abortion, and homosexual  rights, elites adopt the "new"  right 
more  quickly than  the  masses do.  But on constitutionally  murky issues  such  as 
the  right  to choose  when  to die  from  a terminal  illness,  limits on  wiretapping, 
or the use of dogs to sniff out narcotics in airports, elites and masses differ little. 
If rights are what the Supreme  Court says they are, it is neither terribly surprising 
that elites endorse  controversial  claims more (more quickly?) than masses do nor 
terribly  significant  for  liberal  theory.  Only  if  the  book's  operationalization  of 
liberty is the correct one, or only if elites are always more libertarian than masses 
regardless  of current  fashions  in defining  liberty, does  the elite-mass distinction 
carry a lot of weight  (although  exactly what weight  is not clear, as I pointed  out 
above). 
LIMITS  TO  LIBERTY 
Reinforcement  for the claim that McClosky and Brill are somewhat  arbitrary in 
their specification of liberty, in ways that inadvertently magnify differences between 
elites and masses, comes in their discussion of the appropriate limits on freedom. 
The  problem  lies in their acceptance  of the need  to "make fine discriminations 
about the optimal balance between  freedom  and control" (p. 432).  In their eyes, 
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of "time, place, and manner"; at a maximum,  they may at some  point  "cease to 
be  protected  because  they  are troublesome  beyond  a community's  capacity  to 
tolerate" (pp.  20-21).  Although  McClosky and Brill do  not realize it and,  thus, 
make things  confusing  for philosophers,  they are making  two claims here.  The 
first is that there  is an appropriate,  identifiable  distinction  between  procedural 
constraints,  which  are  necessary,  and  substantive  constraints,  which  are  unac- 
ceptable.  The  second  is  that  some  values  may  be  permitted  to  override  the 
expression  of  liberties, but other  values  may not.  Let us consider  each  of  these 
issues in turn. 
The  authors  assert that rights  may,  indeed  must,  be subject to procedural 
controls,  but they may not be limited because of the substantive content  of their 
expression.  The difficulty for Dimensions  of Tolerance,  and by extension  for a liberal 
society,  is that the  "fine discriminations" between  procedure  and  substance  too 
often  seem arbitrary or, worse, drawn along lines that the authors and elites, but 
not necessarily the mass public, approve.  For example,  is government  regulation 
of scientific experiments on human subjects a substantive (unacceptable) constraint 
on  academic  freedom?  Apparently  so,  according  to  the  authors.  Is  requiring 
protest  marchers  to  obtain  a  license  to  march  on  public  roads  a  substantive 
constraint  on freedom  of speech?  Apparently  not, according  to the authors.  Yet 
both  regulations  are  a form  of  government  control  over  the  circumstances  of 
speech  or "speech plus." One  could  plausibly argue  that in this comparison,  the 
distinction  between  acceptable  and unacceptable  constraints  on liberty seems  to 
depend  more  on  the  actors (academics vs. protesters)  or their actions  (research 
or  protest)  than  on  the  analytic  difference  between  procedure  and  substance. 
Furthermore,  one  could  plausibly  make just  the  opposite  distinction  between 
procedural  (acceptable)  and  substantive  (unacceptable)  regulations.  Subjects of 
notorious  experiments  would  surely  see  government  regulations  of  academics 
as protecting  civil liberties;7 Nazis seeking  to march in Skokie, Illinois had ample 
evidence  that licensing  of protesters  substantively  constrains  protest. 
Even more troubling  is a contrast that the authors themselves  draw: "A mass 
demonstration  held  in a public park might  receive  police  protection,  but might 
be dispersed  if held  at the city's busiest  intersection.  A cross burning  by the  Ku 
Klux Klan might  more  easily be tolerated  in a field outside  of a southern  town 
than  in  Harlem" (p.  24).  The  most  obvious  distinction  between  the  acceptable 
and  unacceptable  expressions  of  opinion  in each  of  these  examples  is that the 
acceptable  one  would  have  relatively  little and  the  unacceptable  one  relatively 
great  impact  on  unsympathetic  passersby. Is free  speech  to be  endorsed  only 
when  it has.no  effect?  If  this is the  case,  then  the  difference  between  tolerant 
elites and intolerant  masses is much  less than meets  the eye. 
This point should not be overdrawn.  McClosky and Brill are sometimes  very 
clear about the distinction  between  procedural  and substantive  constraints,  and 
the distinction  has a long, complex,  and honorable  history. But on occasion, both 
in the  book  and  in liberal practice generally,  it seems  to have  more  to do  with 
what outcomes  elites find desirable than with anything  else.8 
McClosky  and  Brill,  and  too  many  other  liberal  theorists,  run  into  more 
trouble in their discussion  of when other values may acceptably constrain liberty. 
7.  See,  e.g.,  James  H. Jones,  Bad Blood: The Tuskegee  Syphilis  Experiment  (New  York: 
Free Press,  1981). 
8.  For a fascinating  argument  that substantive  constraints  on rights are acceptable- 
even  that rights  must  have  substantive  content  to be of deep  value-see  Sheldon  Wolin, 
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It is possible to say "never"-  that rights such as free speech or freedom  to worship 
may never  be  constrained  by another  value  in  a liberal society.  McClosky and 
Brill eschew that position, however, in their claims that "freedom, however desirable 
on  balance,  is not  invariably a social  good"  (p.  20)  and  "freedom  involves  not 
only the removal of restraints, but a weighing  and balancing of utilities, in which 
the  absence  of  restraint  is only  one  element"  (p.  23).  Here  they  are,  perhaps 
innocently,  opening  a can of worms.  What does  it mean  to say that rights  may 
(must) be constrained  by utilities? Which rights? Whose  utility? Who is to weigh 
and judge  the competing  claims of rights and utilities, and by what criteria? And 
so on,  for forests-worth  of journal  articles and legal briefs.9 
I have room  here to make only one  contribution  to this debate.  My greatest 
concern  is  that  too  often  McClosky  and  Brill,  and  decision  makers  in  liberal 
society  for  whom  I  am  using  McClosky  and  Brill  as  stand-ins,  answer  these 
questions  in ways that benefit  elites  and  harm  masses.  In  this book  of  course, 
the benefit  consists only in making elites look tolerant and masses intolerant,  but 
in real life the benefits  may be considerably  more substantial. To limit myself to 
the  book:  why,  for  example,  permit  other  values  to  override  the  freedom  of 
"desecration  of  the  flag ...  by partisans of  a foreign  power  with whom  we  are 
at war" (pp.  23-24),  but  insist  that liberty requires  full  legal  rights  for  people 
suspected  of horrible crimes? Consider  the following  passage: 
The  right to refuse  to bear witness against oneself  is . ..  a protection  based 
on complex  and subtle considerations....  Many people  cannot understand 
why  suspected  criminals  should  be  permitted  to  "hide behind  the  law," 
especially  since their alleged  crimes have demonstrated  disrespect  for the 
law....  To  many observers it seems clear that innocent  defendants  would 
be  eager  to  testify  in order  to  introduce  evidence  in  their  own  defense; 
while guilty defendants  would refuse to testify in order to conceal evidence 
that might convict them....  These  and related arguments,  so often  raised 
by critics of the  Fifth Amendment's  protection  against  self-incrimination, 
have a strong appeal for large segments of the population;  and one wonders 
whether  the  arguments  in  defense  of  the  principle  would  enjoy  much 
acceptance were it not for the frequency with which the principle is enunciated 
in the media. Not surprisingly ...  support for the principle is usually greater 
among  the elites than among  the mass public.  [Pp.  157-58] 
A lot of things  are happening  in this passage.  One  is the subtle and presumably 
unintentional  denigration  of the mass public that I discussed  earlier: masses are 
libertarian mainly because  television  teaches  them  to be so; elites are libertarian 
because  they  understand  "complex  and  subtle  considerations."  Another  is the 
absence  of  consideration  of  structural or environmental  circumstances  which  I 
also discussed  earlier; the  authors  ignore  the  possibility that masses view crime 
differently  than elites because  they suffer more  from  it or lose more  frequently 
in court.  But  most  important  here  is the  possibility that the  mass public in this 
case is placing  the  utilitarian value  of  saving  as many  lives as possible  over  the 
libertarian  value  of  freedom  from  self-incrimination.  Why  is this form  of  con- 
sequentialism  less  acceptable  than  the  consequentialism  that  the  authors  (and 
elites and the Supreme  Court) espouse  in protecting  the flag-and  citizens'  sen- 
sibilities -during  a war? Alternatively,  the masses may define  liberty as the right 
9.  One  of  the  most  persuasive  efforts  to combine  the  best of  rights  theory  with  the 
best of utilitarianism  is T. M. Scanlon,  "Rights, Goals, and Fairness," in Public and Private 
Morality, ed.  Stuart Hampshire  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1978),  pp.  93- 
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to walk the streets in safety, rather than as the right to avoid self-incrimination. 
Why is the substantive definition  of liberty wrong, and the legal definition  right? 
(Note,  by the  way, that we do  not  know why the  masses would  choose  to limit 
suspects' rights,  since they were not asked.) There  may be a compelling  answer 
that would lead us to agree with McClosky and Brill's choice, but none  is offered 
here.  And  the  effect  of  such  a silence  is to  lead  readers  to  see  elites  as more 
tolerant  or  better judges  of  when  tolerance  is preferable  to  some  other  value 
(and therefore  better  Americans)  than  masses.  Only  if the  Supreme  Court  has 
struck just  the  right balance  between  freedom  and utility, or made  exactly  the 
right choice  of which liberty to foster above all others,  can we assume that elites 
who  accept  Court doctrine  really do know best. 
LIBERTY'S LIMITS  ON  OTHER  VALUES 
Before  concluding,  let me  return  one  more  time  to McClosky and  Brill's basic 
assumptions  about liberty in order  to raise one  final problem  of liberal theory. 
Assume  once  more  for the  sake of argument  that there  is a relatively clear-cut 
set of  civil liberties which  most  people  can agree  on,  even  if they  reject them, 
and  that in general,  these  liberties ought  to dominate  other  substantive  values 
in a liberal society. These  assumptions  raise a different  set of  questions  about 
alternative  values and alternative  specifications  of liberty than those  I have just 
discussed. The very insistence that all viewpoints and most actions must be tolerated 
necessarily  elevates  one  set of values  above all others.  There  is no  way around 
that conundrum; tolerance of all values requires that one value (tolerance) dominate 
all others. To  some,  this point is merely a clever ploy in a parlor game, on a par 
with "All the sentences  in this review are false, including  this one." But to others, 
this point is a serious problem; their values or their definition of freedom (whether 
class revolution,  fundamental  Protestantism,  or  vegetarianism)  are  necessarily 
denied in a tolerant society. Some can wall themselves off into a separate community 
which  lives  according  to  an  unconventional  set  of  religious,  moral,  or  sexual 
guidelines;  generally  the courts are sympathetic  to such groups  so long  as they 
do  not  impinge  on others.  But other  values-class  or racial revolution,  for  ex- 
ample-cannot  be satisfied in a small separatist community.  They  must involve 
the whole  society. The  courts have not been  at all sympathetic  to such values as 
soon as they move from speech to action. So libertarianism must deny the validity 
of some  values and some  understandings  of freedom-an  awkwardly intolerant 
position. 
And' once  again,  the  question  of  the  inhibitions  required  by  tolerance  is 
particularly problematic when the tension between civil liberties and other values 
parallels  the  split between  elites  and  masses.  When  elites  hold  the  values  that 
epitomize  liberalism, at least in the eyes of other elites, there is little opportunity 
for the mass public even to express,  never mind institute, coherent  and powerful 
alternatives.  To  this point,  the  book  is mute  witness;  civil liberties  are lovingly 
dissected  and other  values are at most inferred  from intuitive  observation. 
THE  IMPORTANCE  OF ASSUMPTIONS 
What can we conclude  from all this? If McClosky and Brill are correct in all their 
assumptions,  then  American  liberalism will survive only to the degree  that it is 
not  democratic.  That  is, so long  as elites  (defined  by political  activism) remain 
relatively tolerant and masses (defined  by political quiescence)  remain relatively 
intolerant,  then  liberty  will  thrive  only  under  elite  rule.  This  conclusion  is Hochschild  Review Essay  399 
strengthened  if  one  believes,  as  the  authors  sometimes  appear  to,  that  elites 
generally deserve  their position because  they are more intellectual,  enlightened, 
sophisticated,  or otherwise  meritorious.  In that case, the best individuals and the 
best values can reinforce  one  another,  so long  as the masses remain  quiet. 
But  if McClosky and  Brill are incorrect  in any of  their  assumptions,  their 
conclusions  do not hold.  If, for example,  elites simply hold different,  not more, 
libertarian views than  the mass public, then  the  preservation  of liberalism does 
not necessarily require restraints on rule by the masses. If elites are less supportive 
of liberty than attuned  to Supreme  Court decisions,  the same conclusion  holds. 
Alternatively,  if it is the fact of exercising  political power that makes one tolerant, 
and if anyone  who  exercises  power  is capable of the same social learning,  then 
liberalism  requires  even  more  democracy  to  thrive.  And  if  elites  are  tolerant 
because  tolerance  is less costly, psychologically  or physically, for the well-off and 
self-confident,  then  the  pursuit of liberty implies  considerable  redistribution  of 
resources and well-being. If government and corporations are increasingly effective 
as expressors  of rights,  then  the whole  relationship  among  rights,  persons,  and 
institutions  needs  to be rethought.  If the very meaning  of rights and liberties is 
unclear,  or  if  the  meaning  changes  with  the  times,  then  liberty  is less  tied  to 
liberalism  than  the  authors  think and  perhaps  less tied to elite  domination.  If, 
to follow another branch of the "what if" tree, basic liberties should not be limited 
at all, even  elites are insufficiently  libertarian. Or if appropriate  limits are really 
to be class neutral, then perhaps the distinctions between procedures and substance, 
and between  legitimate  and illegitimate  overriding  by another  value, need  to be 
rethought.  Finally, if libertarian tolerance  is not the most important  value for a 
society  to foster,  then  the  civil libertarian state is not  the  best state.  If, that is, 
the mass public holds  coherent,  consistent,  compelling-albeit  nonlibertarian- 
views,  then  perhaps  the  truly  democratic  state  would  not  end  up  being  very 
liberal. And  so on.  Whether  deliberately  or not, Dimensions  of Tolerance  raises all 
sorts of  fascinating  questions  that go  to the  heart of  liberal theory.  I only  wish 
that the authors  had made  more of their opportunity  and their wealth of data. 